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Enclosing in God’s Name, Accumulating for
Mankind: Money, Morality, and Accumulation
in John Locke’s Theory of Property
Onur Ulas Ince
Abstract: John Locke’s theory of property has been the subject of sustained contention
between two major perspectives: a socioeconomic perspective, which conceives
Locke’s thought as an expression of the rising bourgeois sensibility and a defense of
the nascent capitalist relations, and a theological perspective, which prioritizes his
moral worldview grounded in the Christian natural law tradition. This essay argues
that a closer analysis of Locke’s theory of money in the Second Treatise can provide
an alternative to this binary. It maintains that the notion of money comprises a
conceptual area of indeterminacy in which the theological universals of the natural
law and the historical fact of capital accumulation shade into each other. More
speciﬁcally, the ambiguity of the status of money enables Locke to navigate an
antinomy within the natural law such that he establishes a relation of necessity
between the divine telos and accumulative practices.
Introduction
Over the last four decades, there has been a stunning proliferation of interest
in John Locke’s life and philosophy.While the multifaceted richness of Locke’s
thought has been reﬂected in the diversity of the themes and perspectives
embodied in the secondary literature, coming to grips with his theory of prop-
erty, articulated in chapter 5 of the Second Treatise of Government, has been the
sine qua non of any scholarly attempt to shed light on his philosophy. As het-
erogeneous and conﬂictual as this literature is, it is nonetheless possible to
delineate two major interpretive approaches to Locke’s theory of property.
The ﬁrst of these places the emphasis on the social and economic valences
of Locke’s theory. Situating his works in the context of the emergent capital-
ism and English colonialism in the seventeenth century, this strand of
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interpretation considers Locke’s philosophy to be emblematic of the nascent
bourgeois sensibility with its central tenets of self-interest, individualism, uti-
litarianism, alienable wage-labor, robust private property rights, capitalist
accumulation, and natural inequality of wealth.1 The second strand explicates
Locke’s theory of property with reference to his moral worldview, grounded
in Christian theology and the natural law tradition. Emphasis falls here on
Locke’s heavy reliance on the natural law as a divinely decreed system of mor-
ality, which incorporates such premises as the inherent purposefulness of
God’s design, injunction to preserve mankind, fundamental equality of men
as God’s workmanship, sanctity of the person and the inalienability of his
labor, and the priority of charity and common good over absolute private
property rights.2 A more recent development in Locke scholarship has been
1This interpretation ﬂows from the sociological-economic perspective on Locke
opened up by C. B. Macpherson in The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism.
However, the construal of Locke as a distinctively bourgeois thinker ﬁnds an earlier
articulation in the esoteric-hermeneutic mode of reading pioneered by Leo Strauss
in his Natural Right and History, which reconstructs from Locke’s writings a modern,
robust, and singularly liberal philosophical ediﬁce of natural rights. Despite their
divergences on method and philosophical orientation, the two interpretations
concur on the decisively modern, liberal, and bourgeois character of Locke’s
thought. For the socioeconomic perspective on Locke, see C. B. Macpherson, “Locke
on Capitalist Appropriation,” Western Political Quarterly 4, no. 4 (1951): 550–66, and
The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1962); E. J. Hundert, “The Making of Homo Faber: John Locke between
Ideology and History,” Journal of the History of Ideas 33, no. 1 (1972): 3–22; Joyce O.
Appleby, Economic Thought and Ideology in Seventeenth Century England (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1978) and Liberalism and Republicanism in Historical
Imagination (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992); Karen I. Vaughn,
John Locke, Economist and Social Scientist (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980)
and “The Economic Background to Locke’s Two Treatises of Government,” in John
Locke’s “Two Treatises of Government”: New Interpretations, ed. Edward J. Harpham
(Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1992); Neal Wood, The Politics of Locke’s
Philosophy: A Social Study of “An Essay Concerning Human Understanding” (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1983) and John Locke and Agrarian Capitalism
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). For the Straussian school, see Leo
Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953);
Thomas L. Pangle, The Spirit of Modern Republicanism (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1988); Michael P. Zuckert, Natural Rights and the New Republicanism
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994) and Launching Liberalism: On Lockean
Political Philosophy (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2002); Peter C. Myers,
Our Only Star and Compass: Locke and the Struggle for Political Rationality (Lanham,
MD: Rowman and Littleﬁeld, 1998).
2John Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke: An Historical Account of the Argument
of the “Two Treatises of Government” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969);
Karl Olivecrona, “Appropriation in the State of Nature: Locke on the Origin of
Property,” Journal of the History of Ideas 35, no. 2 (1974): 211–30, and “Locke’s Theory
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the impressive growth of a literature on Locke’s involvement in England’s
colonial enterprise, which, while eluding annexation to either strand of
interpretation delineated above, bears momentous implications for both
insofar as it demonstrates the relevance of the colonial context to central
Lockean notions such as property, reason, freedom, morality, religion, and
government.3
of Appropriation,” Philosophical Quarterly 24, no. 96 (1974): 220–34; James Tully,
A Discourse on Property: John Locke and His Adversaries (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1980) and “The Framework of Natural Rights in Locke’s Analysis
of Property,” in An Approach to Political Philosophy: Locke in Contexts (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1993), chap. 3; Richard Ashcraft, Locke’s “Two Treatises
of Government” (London: Allen and Unwin, 1987), Revolutionary Politics and Locke’s
“Two Treatises of Government” (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), and “The
Politics of Locke’s Two Treatises of Government,” in John Locke’s “Two Treatises of
Government”: New Interpretations, ed. Harpham; Eldon Eisenach, “Religion and
Locke’s Two Treatises of Government,” in John Locke’s “Two Treatises of Government”:
New Interpretations; Alex Tuckness, “The Coherence of a Mind: John Locke and the
Law of Nature,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 37, no. 1 (1999): 73–90; Matthew
H. Kramer, John Locke and the Origins of Private Property: Philosophical Explorations of
Individualism, Community, and Equality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1997); Kirstie M. McClure, Judging Rights: Lockean Politics and the Limits of Consent
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); Kim I. Parker, The Biblical Politics of John
Locke (Waterloo: Canadian Corporation for Studies in Religion, 2004).
3For the colonial inﬂections of Locke’s theory of natural law, especially as the latter
concerns property rights of the Amerindians, see James Tully, “Rediscovering
America: The Two Treatises and Aboriginal Rights,” in An Approach to Political
Philosophy, chap. 5, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), and “Aboriginal Property and
Western Theory: Recovering a Middle Ground,” in Theories of Empire, 1450–1800,
ed. David Armitage (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998); Barbara Arneil, “Trade, Plantations,
and Property: John Locke and the Economic Defense of Colonialism,” Journal of the
History of Ideas 55, no. 4 (1994): 591–609, and John Locke and America: The Defence of
English Colonialism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995); Herman Lebovics, “The Uses of
America in Locke’s Second Treatise of Government,” Journal of the History of Ideas 47,
no. 4 (1986): 567–81; David Armitage “John Locke, Carolina, and the ‘Two Treatises
of Government,’” Political Theory 32, no. 5 (2004): 602–27. For a comparison of
Locke’s theoretical position on slavery to the reality of slavery in the English
Atlantic, see James Farr, “‘So Vile and Miserable an Estate’: The Problem of Slavery
in Locke’s Political Thought,” Political Theory 14, no. 2 (1986): 263–89, and “Locke,
Natural Law, and New World Slavery,” Political Theory 36, no. 4 (2008): 495–522.
For the relevance of the Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina to Locke’s political
philosophy, see Celia McGuiness, “The Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina as a
Tool for Lockean Scholarship,” Interpretation 17 (1989): 127–43; John R. Milton,
“John Locke and the Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina,” Locke Newsletter 21
(1990): 111–33; Vicki Hsueh, “Giving Orders: Theory and Practice in the
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The tension between the two interpretations can be more starkly formu-
lated in terms of the divergent principles of organization of the relations of
production and exchange that they extrapolate from Locke’s theory. The
socioeconomic perspective perceives in Locke’s theory of property the foun-
dational principles of a modern market economy insofar as it locates the
center of gravity in the primacy that Locke assigns to free and rational
pursuit of self-interest and accumulation, accompanied by the implied right-
fulness of such corollary negative externalities as inequality and disposses-
sion. In contrast, the theological perspective prioritizes the moral odium
and restrictions that Locke places on acquisitive behavior and hoarding of
wealth, which, coupled with the argument that Locke prescribes production
and exchange for fulﬁlling moral duties towards others, embed his theory of
property in the domain of classical moral economy. For the purposes of this
essay, then, the conﬂictual emphases on the bourgeois and the natural law
premises of Locke’s theory of property translate into two contradictory
visions of social and economic organization. While it is possible to maintain
that Christian religiosity and capitalist behavior are reconcilable at the indi-
vidual level, it is much harder to accommodate the social principles of both
moral economy and market economy within the same theoretical paradigm.
The former economic mode by deﬁnition incorporates moral limits to per-
sonal acquisition and accumulation, while the latter is inherently predicated
on the free pursuit of self-interest and unlimited accumulation. In other
words, restrictions on accumulation are parametric under moral economy,
whereas under market economy they are contingent articles of expediency.
As a result, the following exploration of the relationship between the theolo-
gical and the capitalist premises of Locke’s theory of property operates as an
inquiry into morality and accumulation, or rather, morality of accumulation,
in Locke’s philosophy.
The main argument of this essay is that the conﬂicting renderings of Locke’s
theory of property by the socioeconomic and theological approaches are not
as disparate as they ﬁrst appear, and that a closer analysis of Locke’s theory of
Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina,” Journal of the History of Ideas 63, no. 3 (2002):
425–46, “Cultivating and Challenging the Common: Lockean Property, Indigenous
Traditionalisms, and the Problem of Exclusion,” Contemporary Political Theory 5
(2006): 193–214, and “Unsettling Colonies: Locke, ‘Atlantis,’ and the New World
Knowledges,” History of Political Thought 29 (2008): 295–319. Of particular interest is
Tully’s work in this vein, for it evinces a subtle but important shift of view regarding
the economic valence of Locke’s theory. While hisDiscourse on Property unambiguously
repudiated interpretations of Locke that attributed to him capitalistic tendencies,
Strange Multiplicity and “Rediscovering America” exude a tacit acknowledgment of
the accumulative thrust of Locke’s theory when juxtaposed to the subsistence-oriented
economies of the Amerindians (see Strange Multiplicity, 75, and “Rediscovering
America,” 156–57, 160).
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money in the Second Treatise provides a different rendering of his thought, in
which theological and capitalist premises are not merely reconcilable but
necessarily enmeshed. The existing analyses of Locke’s theory of property
evince a lack of perspicacity about the peculiar position of money in his con-
struction of the Second Treatise, the socioeconomic interpretation arguing that
money is a theoretical intervention to abrogate the limitations of the natural
law on property accumulation, and the theological interpretation claiming
that the origins and the function of money are permissible within the dictates
of the law of nature. While acknowledging that both interpretations have
some element of truth, I maintain that they are limited by their understanding
of Locke’s notion of money as historically contingent and hence in an external
relationship to the universal tenets of his theological framework. I argue, on
the contrary, that a critical examination of the chapter on property shows that
money is not a historical contingency whose relationship to the natural law is
one of passive compatibility or strategic intervention, but rather constitutes
an area of indeterminacy, in which the theological universals of the natural
law and the historical practices of capitalist accumulation shade into each
other. More speciﬁcally, I identify the major work done by the notion of
money in Locke’s theory of property as resolving an antinomy within the
natural law itself and making possible a relationship of necessity between
the natural law and accumulation. I demonstrate that the ingenuity of
Locke’s theory resides in the particular way he sets the terms and the narrative
structure of his account, which enables him to depart from God’s command to
make use of the earth for the beneﬁt of mankind and, passing through
money’s zone of indeterminacy, arrive at the necessity of accumulation,
which renders the seventeenth-century capitalistic practices not merely
permissible but morally commendable.4
Before proceeding further, an important point of clariﬁcation regarding
Christian theology and the natural law is necessary. In this essay I approach
Locke’s notion of morality in a key that holds these two terms to be intimately
entwined. One reason for this is that the “Cambridge school” scholars whom
this essay engages trace the natural law directly to a theological source, and
confronting this argument in its own terms is essential for the demonstration
of my argument.5 There exists a body of compelling scholarship that suggests
4The methodological implication of this argument is that the peculiar connection
between the natural law and accumulation can only be grasped by focusing on the
structural composition of the chapter on property (and of the Second Treatise in
general). This approach is paralleled and necessitated by the manner of Locke’s own
theorization, which manages to derive the necessity of accumulation from a holistic
narrative rendering of the natural law, without assigning it to any single natural
law precept that enters the composition of the narrative.
5The term “Cambridge school” refers to the group of scholars, including Peter
Laslett, John Dunn, James Tully, and Richard Ashcraft, whose work coheres to form
a historicist diatribe against the interpretations of Locke generated by Macpherson
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that the relationship between theology and the natural law is far from
straightforward in Locke’s thought.6 While acknowledging the complexity
of this relationship and the unorthodoxy of Locke’s biblical interpretation,
this essay deploys his notion of natural law as a universally valid and
eternal framework of moral standards with ultimately theological underpin-
nings, which are normatively binding on human activity. Hence, the extent to
which Locke actually derives the natural law from divine law or posits it as a
self-standing ediﬁce is less important for the purposes of this discussion. The
relevant fault line here, as it pertains to the tension between moral economy
and market economy, lies not so much in the distinction between biblical
theology and natural theology as in the fundamental difference between
and Strauss. I borrow the term from Michael P. Zuckert, “Appropriation and
Understanding in the History of Political Philosophy: On Quentin Skinner’s
Method,” Interpretation 13 (1985): 403–24.
6The complicated connection between Christian theology based on biblical teaching
and revelation, and the notion of natural law as an immanent framework of order and
morality accessible to unassisted human reason, has been the subject of meticulous
inquiry. Strauss, for instance, draws attention to the incompatibility between biblical
teaching and Locke’s endeavor to elaborate a capacious law of nature demonstrable
by reason alone, which he argues has led Locke to conclude (yet obfuscate through
religious language) that such law was not law in the proper sense of the term but a
self-standing framework of natural rights (Natural Right and History, 202–22). Taking
his cue from Strauss’s reading, Zuckert holds that Locke’s thought harbors an ambigu-
ity vis-a`-vis biblical teaching such that Locke advances by way of crafting a “natural
theology” and supporting it with biblical exegesis when appropriate. Locke proposes
his own transcendent natural law instead of the Christian-Aristotelian immanent
natural law, and later blurs the difference between reason and revelation to the
point of undermining this transcendent framework (Natural Rights, 253, 258–62;
Launching Liberalism, 5, 14–15, 187–90). While Myers follows Zuckert’s transcendent-
theocentric natural law argument (Our Only Star, esp. chap. 2), Pangle maintains that
the internal moral contradictions of the biblical teaching render its authority on Locke’s
thought conditional upon its compatibility with the “supreme authority of the ‘Law of
Nature, which is the Law of Reason,’” and this process of ﬁltering culminates in a new,
“reasonable” Christian theology (Modern Republicanism, 145, 149–51). In a more recent
analysis, Steven Forde identiﬁes a bifurcated legacy ensuing from the disjuncture
between theological explication and the theory of natural law in Locke’s writings.
While acknowledging the “theological underpinnings” of the natural law, Forde con-
cludes that Locke’s inability to fully develop his philosophy of natural theology
prompted him to present his political theory mostly shorn of its theological supports
(“Natural Law, Theology, and Morality in Locke,” American Journal of Political Science
45, no. 2 [2001]: 396–409). Finally, Waldron conjectures that Locke’s deployment of
natural law as the basis of morality cannot be completely divorced from theology
(at least a natural theology) and needs to be supplemented by biblical elements in
order to cohere (God, Locke, and Equality: Christian Foundations in Locke’s Political
Thought [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002], 94–106).
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universal moral tenets on the one hand, and conventional and customary
normative-regulatory principles, on the other.
Locke’s Theory of Money: An Overview
Instead of providing a detailed reconstruction of Locke’s entire theory of
property in the state of nature, I will focus on the position of money in the
larger proble´matique which John Yolton called “Locke’s dilemma,”7 namely,
“how Men8 might come to have a property in several parts of that which
God gave to mankind in common, and that without any express Compact
of all the Commoners” (II. 25).9 Locke’s way out of this dilemma is to posit
labor as an exclusive property in each person, the expenditure of which on
the natural common removes a portion of it from the common state and
inscribes that person’s private property in it (II. 27, 35). However, God, who
bestows upon man the earth and the means to appropriate it, also places
limits on appropriation (II. 31). The natural law is breached when appropria-
tion overrides, on the one hand, the “sufﬁciency limitation” which dictates
that “enough and as good” should be left in common for the others (II. 27,
33), and, on the other, the “spoilage limitation,” which prohibits one from
engrossing more than one can mix his labor with and make use of before it
perishes (II. 31, 36, 38).10 This double circumscription restricts the amount
of private property in the state of nature “to a very moderate Proportion”
(II. 36). The invention of money and men’s mutual consent to put a value
on it instigate a drastic transformation of this egalitarian state of affairs by
enabling one to “fairly posses more land than he himself could use the
product of, by receiving, in exchange for the overplus, Gold and Silver,
which may be hoarded upwithout injury to anyone” (II. 50), since “the exceed-
ing of the bounds of just Property” lies not “in the largeness of his Possession, but
the perishing of anything uselessly in it” (II. 46). By giving men with different
degrees of industry the opportunity to continue to enlarge their property,
money eventually introduces scarcity of land (II. 45) and “a disproportionate
and unequal Possession of the Earth,” yet without encroaching on anyone’s
natural rights, for the universal consent conferred on the value of money
amounts to the universal consent to the inequality that it engenders (II. 50).
7John Yolton, Locke and the Compass of Human Understanding (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1970), 195.
8I retain Locke’s gender denomination throughout the essay.
9The Two Treatises are cited by treatise and section number, using the following edition
of the text: John Locke, Two Treatises of Government: A Critical Edition with an Introduction
and Apparatus Criticus, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960).
10The terms “sufﬁciency limitation” and “spoilage limitation” were ﬁrst coined by
Macpherson.
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C. B. Macpherson perceives in this chapter a clear “assertion and justiﬁca-
tion of a natural and individual right to property,” in which the role of money
consists in “remov[ing] the limitations inherent in his initial justiﬁcation of
individual appropriation.”11 For Macpherson, Locke’s deployment of the
notion of money is a strategic one, which, while leaving the moral foun-
dations of individual property intact, cleverly opens up the possibility of uti-
lizing “money and land as capital,” introduces alienable wage-labor, and
paves the way for unlimited capitalist appropriation.12 Perhaps most inge-
niously, Locke locates the consent to money, along with its ramiﬁcations, in
the state of nature and thereby establishes property and contract prior to
civil society and hence as a realm independent of politics.13 Despite the critical
broadsides Macpherson’s interpretation has received, the main axis of his
analysis has continued to inform a number of scholars who adhere, albeit
more cautiously and critically, to the premise that Locke’s notion of money
serves the cause of setting capitalist relations of production on solid theoreti-
cal grounds. Locke’s intentions have been described as furthering the idea
of “natural social laws which operated automatically and independently
of man-made institutions”14 and a “natural market society” beyond the
purview of political power, which foreshadowed the “invisible hand”
models of the eighteenth century.15 A closely related argument has been
that his conception of money and property is deﬁnitively capitalistic16 and
promotes “hoarding” as a way of accumulation for investment.17 By sanction-
ing surplus production, Locke’s notion of money justiﬁes the dismantling of
subsistence economies and the dispossession of the English peasants and
the American natives, promotes capitalist relations of production on land,18
and expresses the capitalist thrust for accumulation on a world scale.19 The
success of the strategic introduction of money hinges on circumventing the
11Macpherson, Possessive Individualism, 197, 204. For a detailed account of the
removal of limits, see 204–20.
12Reservations about viewing this question through Marxist class analysis notwith-
standing, Strauss, Pangle, and Zuckert concur with this line of conjecture. See Strauss,
Natural Right and History, 246 and especially 234n, where he states his explicit agree-
ment with Macpherson’s (1951) reading of Locke’s theory of property; Pangle,
Modern Republicanism, 167–69; Zuckert, Natural Rights, 268, and Launching
Liberalism, 192.
13Macpherson, Possessive Individualism, 210.
14Appleby, Liberalism and Republicanism, 60.
15Vaughn, “Economic Background,” 125, 134.
16Ibid., 122; Lebovics, “Uses of America,” 570.
17Vaughn, “Economic Background,” 138; Appleby, Liberalism and Republicanism, 80;
Patrick H. Kelly, “General Introduction: Locke on Money,” in Locke on Money, ed.
Patrick H. Kelly (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 1:3.
18Wood, Agrarian Capitalism, esp. chaps. 3 and 4.
19George Caffentzis, Clipped Coins, Abused Words, and Civil Government: John Locke’s
Philosophy of Money (New York: Autonomedia, 1989), 118–19.
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natural law while leaving it intact, and while some hold that Locke accom-
plishes this maneuver,20 others see in it the destruction of “the moral
purpose associated with God’s gift of the earth”21 and “blatant violations of
natural law.”22
Macpherson’s explication of Locke’s theory has been criticized, on the one
hand, for overlooking the latter’s fundamental theological underpinnings
and downplaying their moral and communitarian implications, and, on the
other, for anachronistically reading full-blown capitalism back into a body
of work that was informed by biblical exegesis and the great natural law tra-
dition.23 Such criticisms emanate from an alternative strand of interpretation,
most clearly articulated by James Tully and Richard Ashcraft, which focuses
on the framework of religion / natural law / morality. In this framework, the
preservation of mankind, the principle of common good, and the moral
injunction to labor on the earth as God’s gift override any natural right to
private property and unconditional accumulation. For Ashcraft, the invention
of money and its consequences ﬁgure as historical contingencies within this
framework, which neither directly issue from nor violate the purposes of
the natural law.24 While admitting that money is pre- or apolitical, he
refuses to conclude that it is “natural.” Rather, money belongs to the
domain of “probable knowledge” and constitutes not a “moral constant”
but a “prudential variable,” and all property accruing from its use is accord-
ingly conventional.25 Although money enables men to acquire more “conven-
iences” through exchange without breaching the moral limitations on
property, it introduces inequality and gives rise to the famous “inconve-
niences of the state of nature” (quarrel and contention), which then drives
men to enter civil society for the protection of natural rights. The conclusions
that Tully draws from Locke’s theory of money are more radical as he recasts
the introduction of money as the moment of the “fall” of man from the
“golden age.”26 The motive behind the accumulation of money is neither
20Macpherson, Possessive Individualism, 213; Vaughn, “Economic Background,” 135.
21Appleby, Liberalism and Republicanism, 89.
22Lebovics, “Uses of America,” 580.
23Dunn, Political Thought; James Tully, A Discourse on Property, and “After the
Macpherson Thesis,” in An Approach to Political Philosophy, chap. 2; Richard
Ashcraft, “Faith and Knowledge in Locke’s Philosophy,” in John Locke: Problems and
Perspectives, ed. John Yolton (London: Cambridge University Press, 1969); Kramer,
Origins of Private Property. Also see Jeremy Waldron, God, Locke, and Equality, chap. 6.
24Ashcraft, Locke’s “Two Treatises,” 139, 141, and Revolutionary Politics, 274–77.
25Ashcraft, Locke’s “Two Treatises,” 50, 53–54, and “Politics of Locke’s Two Treatises,”
32; also see Kramer, Origins of Private Property, 192. The same point has been reiterated
more recently in Parker, Biblical Politics, 137.
26Tully,ADiscourse on Property, 150. The earliest articulation of this contention can be
found in Dunn, Political Thought, 117–19, 247–48. Also see Ashcraft, Locke’s “Two
Treatises,” 144–45; McClure, Judging Rights, 157–60, 180–81. For a psychoanalytic
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the prospect of capitalist investment nor its utility for exchange, but the
miser’s penchant for simple hoarding.27 By inculcating in men the unnatural
and corrupt “desire to have more than one needs,” money renders dysfunc-
tional the natural law of appropriation, which it is the commonwealth’s
task to restitute by redistributing property and bringing it back in line with
God’s original command of the preservation of mankind.28
This emphasis on the theological-moral aspect of Locke’s theory of property
has some plausibility, and Laslett is right to remark that Locke’s reliance on
biblical exegesis in developing a theory of property cannot be accounted for
as “half-conscious traditionalism or plain hypocrisy.”29 On the other hand,
the depiction of Locke as a Christian communitarian with no stake in the
emergent capitalist relations of production is equally untenable. For as Neal
Wood notes, Locke was someone who “invested in the slave trade . . .
charged interest on loans to close friends and was always tight-ﬁsted, rec-
ommended a most inhumane—even for his times—reform of the poor
laws, and bequeathed only a minute proportion of a total cash legacy of
over £ 12,000 to charity.”30 The question that challenges the theological
approach could be put thus: if money is a historically contingent phenomenon
with a merely conventional basis (that is, outside the natural law), why can
the inconveniences it engenders (quarrel and contention) not be resolved by
a simple reversion to the premonetary state, instead of necessitating the for-
mation of commonwealths? The question could be answered from the socio-
economic perspective by stating that Locke is simply trying to justify property
accumulation; however, such an economic reduction of the problem assumes
that the moral foundations of property are ultimately discardable for Locke.
This would be blatantly at odds with the main objective of chapter 5, which is
to demonstrate that the moral foundation of private property remains intact
even at the stage where it is unequally held. The task at hand then becomes to
construct an interpretation that addresses and avoids the pitfalls of both
approaches. A possible way of accomplishing this task, I propose, is to
recast money as an ambivalent conceptual ground that allows Locke to estab-
lish a necessary relationship between the precepts of the natural law and the
process of capital accumulation. This theoretical move necessitates situating
interpretation of the problems that ensue from the introduction of money, see Carol
Pech, “His Nuts for a Piece of Metal: Fetishism in the Monetary Writings of John
Locke,” in Feminist Interpretations of John Locke, ed. Nancy J. Hirschmann and Kirstie
M. McClure (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press), 269–95.
27Tully, A Discourse on Property, 148.
28Ibid., 151–54. For a more bivalent interpretation of the “desire to have more than
one needs,” see Kelly, “General Introduction,” 95.
29Laslett, introduction to Two Treatises, 105. Also see Parker, Biblical Politics, chap. 1.
30Wood, Agrarian Capitalism, 74.
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money in the broader framework of a teleological imagination of progress,
which, as I demonstrate below, informs Locke’s theory of property.
Teleology of the Natural Law and the “Dilemma of the Rational
and Industrious”
A theoretical constant based on “the architectonic importance of theology” in
Locke’s thought is the idea of the purposefulness of creation.31 As Ashcraft
puts it, for Locke, “God has not only put us here; He intends us to do some-
thing.”32 Men are created innately equipped with the capacity for reason that
is necessary for apprehending God’s purpose (telos), which manifests itself in
the form of the obligations under the natural law.33 The ﬁrst and most impor-
tant moral obligation is the preservation of mankind, which Locke constantly
reiterates in the Two Treatises of Government:
God having made Man, and planted in him . . . a strong desire of
Self-preservation and furnished the World with things ﬁt for Food and
Rayment and other Necessaries of Life, Subservient to his design, that
man should live and abide for some time upon the Face of the Earth,
and not that so curious and wonderful a piece of Workmanship by its
own Negligence, or want of Necessaries, should perish again, presently
after a few moments of continuance. (I. 86)34
God has intended men to “Increase and Multiply” (I. 41) and given them the
means for realizing this intention, though not without effort. The telos of self-
preservation is coupled with the obligation to labor on the earth in order to
provide for human needs. Locke asserts in the chapter on property, “God,
when he gave the World in common to all Mankind, commanded man also
to labour, and the penury of his condition required it of him” (II. 32).35 “He
gave it to the use of the Industrious and Rational (and Labour was to be his
title to it)” (II. 34). “God commanded, and his Wants forced him to labour”
31Ashcraft, “Politics,” 19.
32Ashcraft, Locke’s “Two Treatises,” 38.
33For further discussion of the teleological aspect of Locke’s philosophy, see
Waldron, Private Property, 141–46, and God, Locke, and Equality, 159–63; Ashcraft,
Locke’s “Two Treatises,” 38, 50, 135, and “Politics,” 19–25.
34For similar passages see I. 41, 87, 88, and II. 6, 7, 16, 25, 26, 36, 37, 43, 44, 87, 171.
35Pangle perceives in the penury of man’s natural condition and the drudgery of
labor the signs of a “grotesquely unjust” and “tyrannically cruel” God (Modern
Republicanism, 145). Zuckert elaborates a less extreme version of the disjuncture
between labor as an instrumental activity and its biblical rendering as a moral
dictate from God (Natural Rights, 262–63). Although Waldron’s initial interpretation
of labor follows a similar instrumentalist perspective (Private Property, 147), his later
work adopts a more providentialist position and rejects the idea of an indifferent
God (God, Locke, Equality, 96, 158).
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(II. 35). Labor’s status as divine injunction renders it a fundamentally moral
act. As Waldron remarks, “Laboring is not just something we happen to do
to resources . . . it is the appropriate mode of helping oneself to the resources
given what resources are for.”36 It is this embeddedness in the framework of
the natural law that underpins Locke’s theory of property, whereby “mixing
one’s labor” entitles the laborer to private property not only on practical but
also on moral terms.37
Labor in the service of the preservation of mankind is further qualiﬁed by a
third moral obligation, which directs it to the subjection and improvement of the
earth. Initially contenting himself with property rights in the provisions “pro-
duced by the spontaneous hand of nature” (II. 26), Locke later proclaims the
“chief matter of Property” to be the earth itself and contends, “God and his
Reason commanded him to subdue the Earth, i.e. improve it for the beneﬁt
of Life. As much Land as a Man Tills, Plants, Improves, Cultivates, and can
use the Product of, so much is his property” (II. 32). As with the previous obli-
gations, the improvement of land is not a mere technical expediency but the
appropriate method for supporting livelihood. God has intended the unculti-
vated land lying in nature to be brought under the improving labor of
man. “God gave the World to Men in Common; but since he gave it them
for their beneﬁt, and the greatest Conveniences of Life they were capable to
draw from it, it cannot be supposed He meant it should always remain
common and uncultivated” (II. 34). At this juncture in chapter 5, the terms
of discussion change noticeably and the binary of “value” and “waste,”
through which Locke articulates the telos of improvement, takes the fore-
ground. Although all useful things owe the greater part of their value to
labor, none does so more than land, which is “of so little value, without
labor” (II. 36). If not enclosed and improved by man, God’s gift lies as “neg-
lected, and consequently waste Land” (ibid.). In other words, enclosing and
improving the waste of the earth is not only a more efﬁcient way of producing
the conveniences of life, it is also a moral duty because by rescuing land from
waste, it more fully consummates the purpose for which God has bestowed
the earth on men.38 This is in contrast to hunting and gathering in the ﬁrst
stages of the state of nature, exempliﬁed for Locke by the American
natives, which not only renders men “needy and wretched” for the want of
36Waldron, God, Locke, Equality, 160. On the morality of labor, also see Ashcraft,
“Politics,” 32; Tully, A Discourse on Property, 116–21; Hundert, “Homo Faber,” 5;
Parker, Biblical Politics, 136.
37Ashcraft, Locke’s “Two Treatises,” 134. The labor theory of appropriation is articu-
lated in sections 27–36 in the Second Treatise.
38The contrast between common waste and improved private property is developed
in II. 36–37, 41–45. On the binary of waste and improvement, see Strauss, Natural
Right and History, 243–44; Ashcraft, “Politics,” 37–38; Pangle, Modern Republicanism,
163–65; Waldron, Private Property, 169–70, 221–22.
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labor and improvement (II. 37), but also falls short of following God’s purpose
by letting waste the resources that could be made use of.
At this point one begins to discern a progressive imaginary. As men rescue
more land from waste by enclosing and cultivating it, as they labor and
produce more necessities and conveniences for the beneﬁt of life, in other
words, as they transform greater parts of the world into valuable things,
they better fulﬁll the obligations of the natural law, and more fully consum-
mate God’s purpose.39 The crucial term Locke devises to substantiate this pro-
gressive imaginary is “common stock of mankind”:
To which let me add, that he who appropriates land to himself does not
lessen but increase the common stock of mankind. For the provisions
serving to support humane life, produced by one acre of inclosed and cul-
tivated land, are (to speak much within compasse) ten times more, than
those, which are yeilded by an acre of Land, of equal richnesse, lyeing
wast in common. And therefore he, that incloses Land and has a greater
plenty of the conveniencys of life from ten acres, than he could have
from an hundred left to Nature, may truly be said, to give ninety acres
to Mankind. (II. 37, emphasis added)
The increase in the common stock is not restricted to leaving more land avail-
able for others to enclose and improve, but extends to the products of the
earth, as the example of Spain testiﬁes: “the Inhabitants think themselves
beholden to him, who, by his Industry on neglected, and consequently
waste Land, has increased the stock of Corn, which they wanted” (II. 36, empha-
sis added).40 The example of America is most suggestive:
An Acre of Land, that bears here Twenty Bushels of Wheat, and another in
America, which, with the same Husbandry, would do the like, are, without
doubt, of the same natural, intrinsick Value. But yet the Beneﬁt Mankind
39This is not to imply that the material progress and comfortable (as opposed to
bare) subsistence that Strauss attributes to the “pursuit of happiness” are in fact the
unintended consequence of an ascetic work ethic, as has been held by Weberian expla-
nations (Natural Right and History, 235–36). Rather, it is vital for Locke’s overall thesis
that a utilitarian practical orientation and the fulﬁllment of moral obligations reveal
themselves at every turn to be identical. This identity opens up the possibility of a
reading of Locke’s theory of property beyond a minimalist conception of moral
obligations.
40As a result, the “enough and as good” proviso is satisﬁed by the increase in the
amount of available land, and where this is not possible, by the increase in the
amount of available provisions, prior to the invention of money. Dispossession does
not violate the “enough and as good” proviso insofar as the dispossessed is offered
the opportunity to labor for a living wage. For a brief and cogent account of the
way in which the spoilage limitation supplants the “enough and as good” limitation
by way of subsistence, increased common stock, welfare, and charity, see Zuckert,
Natural Rights, 255, 266–71; Forde, “Natural Law,” 401.
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receives from the one, in a Year, is worth 5 l. and from the other possible not
worth a Penny. (II. 43, emphasis added)
The notion of the common stock of mankind constitutes the privileged nexus
in Locke’s theory of property, around which the obligations to preserve, to
labor, and to improve are interwoven and set in moral, teleological motion.
God has furnished the earth with material intended for not only the necessi-
ties but also the conveniences of life, which allow men to augment their liveli-
hood beyond bare subsistence (as attested by the English day laborer’s
much-celebrated prosperity compared to the Indian king’s penury [II. 41]).
And since the conveniences are proportional to the common stock of
mankind, the enlargement of the latter must be thought of as a part of
God’s design and hence as teleological in structure.41 The more mankind
expands its common stock through the improvement of land by labor for the
preservation of mankind, the more it approximates to fulﬁlling God’s purpose.
The increase in the common stock, however, does not readily assume the
form of accumulation. The theological precept that the fruits of the earth
are intended for the use of mankind (spoilage limitation) restricts the extent
of the common stock to what can be actually utilized by human beings
before it perishes. The point is obvious in the case of the individual producer
for whom it is “a foolish thing, as well as dishonest, to hoard up more than he
could make use of” (II. 46). One solution Locke proposes to spoliation limit-
ation is gift or barter:
If he gave away a part to anybody else, so that it perished not uselessly in
his Possession, these he also made use of. And if he also bartered away
Plumbs that would have rotten in a Week, for Nuts that would last
good for his eating a whole Year, he did no injury; he wasted not the
common Stock; destroyed no part of the portion of Good that belonged
to others, so long as nothing perished uselessly in his hands. (II. 46)
The crucial point to note here is that while gift or barter overcomes the spoi-
lage limitation for the individual producer, the same limitation remains in
effect for mankind as a whole.42 Even the most durable of goods, such as
nuts, are ultimately intended for concrete use and not for accumulation.
That is to say, while saving the common stock from waste, barter
41Despite its exclusion of teleology, Strauss’s observation regarding the centrality of
“conveniences” to Locke’s theory of property remains more compelling than Ashcraft’s
account, which downplays the signiﬁcance of all property beyond subsistence
(Strauss, Natural Right, 238; Ashcraft, “Politics,” 32, and Locke’s “Two Treatises,” 139).
The element of historical teleology, while reduced to a secular-materialist Whiggish
skeleton, also ﬁnds its place in Pangle’s interpretation of Locke’s theory of property
(Pangle, Modern Republicanism, 165).
42Hundert notes that Locke was cognizant of the complex systems of barter and
symbolic exchange among the natives of America, yet disqualiﬁed them as a proper
solution to the spoilage limitation (Hundert, “Homo Faber,” 573–74).
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circumscribes it with the concrete needs of mankind at a given moment.
Subsistence or “hand-to-mouth existence,” regardless of how much it is
enriched by the conveniences, remains the paradigm of production and
consumption.
At this juncture, Locke’s interpretation of the natural law, if one may allow
the expression, reaches its limits from within and reveals an internal impasse.
The industrious and rational, to whom God gave the earth, heed their calling
and ardently enclose, improve, and increase the common stock only to ﬁnd
themselves to be producing more than can actually be used, and thereby vio-
lating God’s proscription of spoilage. Since the “terrors of natural law no
longer strike the covetous, but the waster,”43 the industrious and rational
face “an ethical dilemma.”44 They can avoid spoilage by limiting their labor
to what can be used by themselves and others. This would entail enclosing
and improving less than they could if the spoilage limitation did not exist,
and hence leaving most of God’s gift wasting in common, which is clearly
at odds with his intentions, for “it cannot be supposed He meant it should
always remain common and uncultivated” (II. 34). Alternatively, they can
enclose, improve and rescue as much land from waste as their capacity to
labor permits. This ultimately culminates in overproduction and the sub-
sequent wasting of the fruits of labor, which is equally against God’s
purpose, for “if either the grass on his enclosure rotted on the ground, or
the fruit of his planting perished without gathering, and laying up, this
part of the Earth, notwithstanding his enclosure, was still to be looked on
as waste” (II. 38). Put differently, the dilemma is between letting waste and
making waste, or the loss of potential value and actual value.
The contradiction in question is a grim one, for it implies a contradiction
within the natural law. To acknowledge it as such would amount to imputing
an inconsistency to the providential design, thereby throwing into question
the moral fundament on which Locke erects his theory of property.
Consequently, there must be something that could show that this apparent
inconsistency is not an inconsistency at all, and that it is possible to unleash
the full force of industry and labor in the service of God’s purpose. There
must be a way to labor and bring the entire waste of the earth under cultiva-
tion without violating the spoilage limitation, which means that there must be
a way to store the value created by labor without letting it decay and return to
the waste of the common. In other words, there must be a way to accumulate if
the dilemma of the industrious and rational is to be dispelled. Given this
necessary relationship between consummating God’s purpose and accumu-
lating value, in turn, there must be a medium in which value can be disen-
tangled from the transience of the perishable goods and accumulated in
43Strauss, Natural Right and History, 237.
44Ashcraft, “Politics,” 38.
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abstract form for the satisfaction of anonymous future needs. In short, there
must be money.
Money: Deus Ex Machina
Even though Locke cannot directly derive the possibility of accumulation
from the original precepts of the natural law, his construction of his theory
of property culminates in the necessity of accumulation for the consummation
of God’s purpose. I argue that the introduction of money, as the medium of
accumulation par excellence, should be understood as Locke’s attempt to navi-
gate this paradox. However, since Locke cannot deduce the existence of
money from the natural law, he assigns it a conventional position, which
renders money an indeterminate phenomenon that is historical and consen-
sual in its origin yet theological and teleological in its import. In what
follows, I elaborate this point by explicating, on the one hand, the work
money does in Locke’s theory of property, and on the other, the peculiarity
of the consent from which it is born.
The primary function of money is the fulﬁllment of the spoilage limitation
in a way that allows for accumulation.45 Unlike the concrete products of labor,
money would “keep without wasting or decay” (II. 37) and “may be hoarded
up without injury to any one” (II. 50). One “might heap up as much of these
durable things as he pleased; the exceeding of his just Property not lying in the
largeness of his Possessions, but the perishing of any thing uselessly in it” (II.
46). However, contrary to what Tully argues, the motive behind the accumu-
lation of money is not “miser’s reason,”46 but the possibility of converting the
stored abstract value back into use-value: “And thus came in the use of Money,
some lasting thing man might keep without spoiling, and that by mutual
consent Men would take in exchange for the truly useful, but perishable
Supports of Life” (II. 47). While remaining within the paradigm of
production-for-use, money introduces an element of temporal freedom by
making it possible to postpone the moment of use indeﬁnitely, at least in prin-
ciple. In so doing, it liberates men from the requirement of immediately using
the products of labor (“hand-to-mouth existence”) and enables them to
rationally orient their productive activities towards some perceived future
good.47
45For a detailed discussion of the relation of money to spoilage limitation, see
Waldron, Private Property, 207–8, and God, Locke, Equality, 170–71.
46Tully, A Discourse on Property, 150.
47On money’s centrality to unleashing the productive, transformative, and edifying
powers of labor, and to introducing an element of future-orientation in acquisitive be-
havior, see Strauss, Natural Right and History, 240–49; Pangle, Modern Republicanism,
163–66; Zuckert, Natural Rights, 268–69. On Locke’s ideas on “hand-to-mouth
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The new element of temporal freedom harbors momentous implications for
the binary of waste and value, and it is not coincidental that this binary makes
its appearance in the very section (II. 36) where money is mentioned for the
ﬁrst time. Money resolves the dilemma between “letting waste” and
“making waste” by suspending the latter, and frees men to focus their ener-
gies on enclosing and cultivating not in accordance with their concrete
immediate needs, but based on the extent of their capacity to labor.
Consequently, insofar as the subjection of the earth through labor is among
God’s intentions for the world (II. 34–35), money proves indispensable for
the consummation of the theological telos. Given this theological signiﬁcance,
it is hard to conceive of money as amere practical expediency. This point ﬁnds
support from several central passages in chapter 5, which suggest that the
invention of money ushers a whole new way of imagining mankind’s relationship
to the world:
yet there are great tracts of Grounds to be found, which (the Inhabitants
thereof not having joined the rest of Mankind, in the consent of the Use
of their common money) lie waste, and are more than the People, who
dwell on it, do, or can make use of, and so still lie in common. Tho’ this
can scarce happen amongst that part of Mankind, that have consented
to the Use of Money. (II. 45)
Note that in this passage, enclosure and improvement of land as grounds of
entitlement are annexed to the logic of money, which is at once the condition
and the substantiation of the drive to exhaust the earth through its transform-
ation into value. Wherever money is used, the land ceases to be waste in prin-
ciple, without regards to the actual state of land, as attested by the fact that
Locke does not use the term “waste” to denote the land “left in common by
compact” in England (II. 35). With this move, Locke equates the presence
or absence of a progressive attitude that strives to put an end to the waste
of the world with the presence or absence of monetarization:
Where there is not something both lasting and scarce, and so valuable to
be hoarded up, there Men will not be apt to enlarge their Possessions of
Land, were it never so rich, never so free for them to take. For I ask,
What would a Man value Ten Thousand, or an Hundred Thousand
Acres of excellent Land, ready cultivated, and well stocked too with
Cattle, in the middle of the in-land parts of America, where he had no
hopes of Commerce with other Parts of the World, to draw Money to
him by the Sale of the Product? It would not be worth inclosing, and we
should see him give up again to the wild Common of Nature, whatever
was more than would supply the Conveniences of Life to be had there
for him and his Family. (II. 48, last emphasis added)
existence,” as emblematized by the seventeenth-century English poor, see Appleby,
Economic Thought and Ideology, 83, and Hundert, “Homo Faber,” 19–20.
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Thus in the beginning all the World was America, and more so than that
is now; for no such thing as Money was any where known. Find out
something that hath the Use and Value of Money amongst his
Neighbours, you shall see the same Man will begin presently to enlarge
his Possessions. (II. 49)
These passages also shed light on the true signiﬁcance of the term “waste”
repeatedly and emphatically used by Locke throughout II. 36–50. For an
objective empiricist, such as Locke is taken to be, there can be nothing
“waste” in nature as such, but the latter is apprehended as wasting only
when looked upon with a progressive and acquisitive gaze that perceives
the world as a reservoir of potential value to be extracted and accumulated.48
Whether a plot of land is “worth inclosing” is predicated on whether it is
possible to accumulate the value that is derived from it, which, in turn,
hinges on the use of money.49 As a result, money becomes the nexus
around which the religious teleology of subduing the earth and the practices
geared towards the accumulation of value coalesce.50 From this perspective,
the enlargement of possessions and the subsequent scarcity in land under a
monetary economy is not to be lamented but rather celebrated as the sign
of a closer approximation to God’s purpose. Such scarcity entails disposses-
sion and inequality in land, true, but it ameliorates this inequality by a
boost in the production of value that feeds into the common stock of
mankind, which renders a day laborer in England better fed, lodged, and
48Locke’s comparison of uncultivated land in America to its cultivated counterpart
in England on the basis of the “proﬁt” it would yield “if it were to be valued and sold”
(II. 43) is a suggestive expression of this acquisitive outlook.
49In this respect I ﬁnd Ashcraft’s assertion “Money, that is, is useful in the context of
trade, and trade, Locke believes—not ‘unlimited appropriation’—is beneﬁcial to
everyone” to be incomplete (Ashcraft, “Politics,” 38–39). Ashcraft’s criticism of
Macpherson is justiﬁed only insofar as “unlimited appropriation” is taken in the
narrow sense of individual wealth, whereas I think the stakes in Locke’s theory are
far larger than “possessive individualism” and accumulation of individual fortune.
What is articulated here is indeed “unlimited accumulation” but at the global level
whose scale is “mankind,” or, to use Caffentzis’s phrase, a theory of “possessive uni-
versalism” (Caffentzis, Clipped Coins, 118–19). Also evocative is Pangle’s expression
“dynamic individualism,” which underlies the “goal of unlimited accumulation of
exchangeable value . . . in a society suffused with the Lockean spirit” (Pangle,
Modern Republicanism, 168–69).
50From this perspective, such capitalist relations on land as large enclosures and
agricultural improvement that Locke endorsed in seventeenth-century England are
part and parcel of the theological parameters of his theory of property. For the agrarian
capitalist tenets of Locke’s thought and his historical involvement with the “Baconian
improvers,” see Wood, Agrarian Capitalism, chapters 2 and 3; Kelly, “General
Introduction,” 100. For a more textual extrapolation of the Baconian inﬂuence in
Locke’s thought, see Pangle, Modern Republicanism, 166; Zuckert, Natural Rights, 203.
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clad than a king of a large and fruitful territory in America (II. 41).51 Hence
money not only leaves intact the moral obligation to preserve all mankind,
it fulﬁlls it better than the more egalitarian yet more penurious premonetary
system, barter and gift notwithstanding.52 And to bring matters full circle,
since the expansion of the common stock of mankind is meant by God,
money, as the precondition of this expansion, evinces a kernel of theological
import.
The Paradox of “Natural Consent”
A major objection can be raised to the line of argumentation presented above
by pointing out that for Locke, money is strictly consensual and anything that
is consensual is squarely outside the domain of the natural law. Indeed,
“consent” and “agreement” constantly reappear in Locke’s discussion of
money in chapter 5: “the invention of money and the tacit agreement of
men to put a value on it, introduced (by consent) larger possessions, and a
51What Locke inaugurates here is nothing short of a magniﬁcent reversal of the con-
ventional terms governing the reception and understanding of property relations and
social justice. Locke renders “the private” the door opening onto “the common good,”
or in Zuckert’s words, “by taking, he gives” (Natural Rights, 269–70). Particularization
of the common becomes the precondition for universal prosperity; dispossession paves
the road to welfare (as in the case of the day laborer), while persistence in holding
things in common (as do the Indians) appears as virtual theft from the prospective
wealth of mankind.
52Most importantly, the much-debated right to charity espoused in the First Treatise
(I. 42) remains in force, and it operates even more efﬁciently since there is now a larger
common stock fromwhich to dispense charity. The issue of charity in Locke has been a
major node of contention, particularly inasmuch as it has been made into a bulwark
against unlimited accumulation (see, for example, Tully, A Discourse on Property, esp.
chap. 6). While it is the case that for Locke charity is an enforceable right that gives
the destitute a minimal entitlement to others’ economic surplus, this right circum-
scribes accumulation only insofar as one conceives of the economy as a “zero-sum
game” whereby one’s gain is another’s loss. However, it has been consistently
argued throughout this paper that a “positive-sum game” qua increased common
stock is a fundamental premise of Locke’s theory of property. Consequently, charity
as a right to surplus under conditions of extreme want, especially when prequaliﬁed
with work obligations, is quite compatible with Locke’s accumulative worldview.
This position can be most readily gleaned from Locke’s “An Essay on the Poor
Law,” in Locke: Political Essays, ed. Mark Goldie (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1997). For a comprehensive articulation of the idea of charity as an enforceable
right, see John Simmons, The Lockean Theory of Rights (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1992), esp. 307–54. For a similar argument, see Waldron, God, Locke, Equality,
170–87. For an account of Locke’s vision of political economy as a positive-sum
game based on labor, efﬁciency, and commerce, see Steven Pincus, 1688: The First
Modern Revolution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), chap. 12.
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right to them” (II. 36); “had agreed that a little piece of yellowmetal . . . should
be worth a great piece of ﬂesh, or a whole heap of corn” (II. 37); “in the
consent of the use of their common money” (II.45); “things that fancy or
agreement hath put the value on” (II. 46); “money . . . that by mutual
consent men would take in exchange for the truly useful, but perishable sup-
ports of life” (II. 47); “riches . . . have but a fantastical imaginary value” (II.
184). The penultimate section of chapter 5 is where Locke brings the articula-
tion of land, labor, money, and property to a close, and hence is worth citing in
its entirety:
But since Gold and Silver, being little useful to the Life of Man in pro-
portion to Food, Rayment, and Carriage, has its value only from the
consent of Men, whereof labour yet makes, in great part, the measure; it
is plain, that men have agreed to a disproportionate and unequal
Possession of the Earth; they having, by tacit and voluntary consent,
found out a way how a man may fairly possess more land than he
himself could use the product of, by receiving, in exchange for the over-
plus, gold and silver, which may be hoarded up without injury to
anyone. . . . This partage of things in an inequality of private possessions,
men have made practicable out of the bounds of Societie, and without
compact; only by putting a value on gold and silver, and tacitly agreeing
in the use of Money. For in Governments, the Laws regulate the right of
property, and the possession of land is determined by positive consti-
tutions. (II. 50)
The conclusion Ashcraft and Tully derive from these passages is that Locke is
trying to demonstrate that property based on money is conventional and
cannot be justiﬁed on the grounds of natural rights.53 For Macpherson and
others, however, locating the consent to money outside the bounds of
society amounts to nothing short of the “naturalization” of money along
with the property based on it by excluding their foundations from the
domain of political human agency.54 Put differently, the former interpretation
focuses on the presence of consent and concludes with money-as-convention,
whereas the latter emphasizes the absence of compact and arrives at
money-as-nature. Once again, the question is reduced to the choice
between nature and convention, and Locke is forced to choose sides.
I maintain, against this binary, that Locke’s theory of property, insofar as it
posits a relationship of necessity between theological universals and accumu-
lative practices, cannot choose sides regarding the nature of money. For the
indeterminacy of the consent without compact that underpins money is the
very strength of his theory, in that it allows Locke to depart from theological
53Ashcraft, Locke’s “Two Treatises,” 139; “Politics,” 30; Tully, A Discourse on Property,
147. Also see Parker, Biblical Politics, 136–37; McClure, Judging Rights, 171.
54Macpherson, Possessive Individualism, 210; Appleby, Liberalism and Republicanism,
60; Vaughn, “The Economic Background,” 125, 134.
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injunctions (preserve mankind, labor, and subdue the earth) and arrive at the
moral necessity of accumulative practices (increasing the common stock of
mankind).55 Yet in the process, the explicitly consensual language around
money saves Locke the trouble of holding the difﬁcult position that God
directly commanded men to accumulate capital even if this meant wide-
spread dispossession and inequality of wealth. In this respect, money
remains a peculiar beast with historical and contingent origins yet theological
and moral impact. It cannot be derived from the natural law without commit-
ting absurdity; neither can it be reduced to sheer convention without imped-
ing the actualization of God’s purpose. Hence the mode of existence that
money inhabits is paradoxical and can be best expressed by the oxymoronic
term “natural consent.”
The understanding of Locke’s notion of money as a paradoxical “natural
consent” or an area of indeterminacy ﬁnds some support from a close
reading of some passages in the Second Treatise. The most striking character-
istic of the consent given to the use and value of money is its universality.
Going back to section 50, “men” who “have agreed to a disproportionate
and unequal possession of the earth” are clearly not a particular group of
men but all mankind, the protagonist of the Second Treatise. Similarly, “the
earth” denotes not a particular geography but the entire world (Locke other-
wise speciﬁes America, England, Spain, etc.).56 This assumption of the uni-
versality of the consent to money does not budge in the face of factual
contradiction. The absence of a monetary economy in America, rather than
opening money’s universality to question, renders the ancestral lands of
Native Americans “natural common” until they “join the rest of mankind,
in the consent of the Use of their common Money” (II. 45).57 This arrogation
55Caffentzis deserves credit for recognizing the exclusion of money from both the
natural law and the social contract. However, he concludes by subsuming money
under “philosophical law” or “the law of fashion,” which misses its theological signiﬁ-
cance by reducing its use to a matter of habit. See Caffentzis, Clipped Coins, 68, 144–50.
Similarly, Howard Schweber makes a promising move by recognizing the “ambiguous
developmental space” in which the invention of money occurs but immediately
reduces it to an “example of customary law in action” (Schweber, “From Nature to
Convention: The Political Implications of Locke’s Theories of Law and Language”
[paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association,
Chicago, April 2009], 23).
56A decade later, Locke reiterates this point all the more clearly in his famous econ-
omic tract Some Considerations of the Consequences of the Lowering of Interest, and Raising
the Value of Money: “For Mankind, having consented to put an imaginary Value upon
Gold and Silver . . . have made them by general consent the common Pledges” (Locke,
Some Considerations, in Locke on Money, ed. Kelly, 1:233). This suggests that the assump-
tion of universality espoused earlier in the Second Treatise is neither accidental nor
temporary.
57Lebovics notes that Locke “understood that Wampompeke was used in ceremo-
nial situations not primarily as a means of commercial exchange (‘common Money’)
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could be theoretically explained if and only if one presupposes the universal-
ity of money as a principle of necessity that binds the entirety of mankind.58 If
one group of people has not joined in the consent to money, it is they, and not
money nor “mankind,” who are at fault. Moreover, money is not only a
phenomenon that rests on universal consent, it is the only phenomenon that
does so. True, there are other instances of mutual consent in the state of
nature, such as marriage, master-servant relations, and exchange of goods,
but these are particularistic contracts that only obligate the parties involved,
whereas the consent to money binds all mankind.59
As a point of comparison, the only phenomenon whose foundations evince
an afﬁnity with those of money is inheritance of property. In section 88 of the
First Treatise Locke asks the question “how come Children by this right of pos-
sessing, before any other, the properties of their Parents upon their Decease”
and discourses:
in the sense that coins of precious metals were in Europe” (Lebovics, “Uses of
America,” 578).
58Kelly tries to resolve this conundrum by construing the term “universal” as “ana-
logous to its use in the term ‘universal truth,’ i.e., everyone on having the advantages
of gold and silver as the medium of exchange explained to him, necessarily consents to
their adoption” (“General Introduction,” 88). This interpretation fails to explain how
the status of a consensual practice can be akin to “universal truth” unless it is
already inscribed in the natural order of human reality, which redirects one to the
domain of the natural law.
59The position of consent in Locke’s political philosophy, and in particular the
relationship between express and tacit consent, has been a controversial subject. A
major point of contention is whether the notion of consent encompasses a broad
array of voluntary acquiescence, as Dunn maintains, or denotes a much more
clearly delimited domain of informed and intentional acts, an argument forwarded
by John Simmons. A comprehensive review of the relevant literature here, let alone
a conclusive treatment of the matter, surpasses the scope of this essay. However, I
would like to mention brieﬂy the inadequacy of the views presented above with
respect to the analysis of money. While Simmons’s examination of the express and
tacit forms of consent is to my knowledge the most meticulous one, it principally con-
cerns itself with their political dimension, and the invention of money as a prepolitical
act of tacit consent (and a very peculiar one at that) falls outside its purview. In con-
trast, while Dunn’s discussion is more expansive, his stretched conception of
consent lacks the analytic acuity necessary to analyze the “universal tacit consent”
to money. These points merely underscore that the question of money could
provide a fresh avenue of thinking about Locke’s theory of consent. See John Dunn,
“Consent in the Political Theory of John Locke,” in Political Obligation in Its Historical
Context (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), chap. 3; John Simmons,
“‘Denisons’ and ‘Aliens’: Locke’s Problem of Political Consent,” Social Theory and
Practice 24, no. 2 (1998): 161–82, and On the Edge of Anarchy: Locke, Consent, and the
Limits of Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).
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’Twill perhaps be answered, that common consent hath disposed of it, to
the Children. Common Practice, we see indeed does so dispose of it but
we cannot say, that it is the common consent of Mankind; for that hath
never been asked, nor actually given: and if common tacit Consent hath
establish’d it, it would make a positive and not Natural right of
Children to Inherit the Goods of their Parents: But where the practice is
universal, ’tis reasonable to think the Cause is Natural. (I. 88)
In the light of the logic presented in this passage, the position of money
appears peculiar. On the one hand, the tacit consent underpinning the use of
money would clearly position the latter in the domain of positive law, yet
this contradicts Locke’s contention that America is natural commons
because the Indians have not joined the common consent to money. On the
other hand, the universality of this consent and its binding validity for
mankind would lead one to conclude that “where the practice is universal,
it is reasonable to think the cause is natural”; nevertheless, Locke is incontro-
vertibly clear about the consensual origins of money. To summarize this point,
if the use of money is natural because universal, and hence binds mankind,
then it cannot be based on consent; if, in contrast, it is consensual and conven-
tional, then it cannot be natural and hence lacks the power to bind mankind.
This leaves money in an ambiguous, indeterminate position located on the
border between positive and natural law.60
The paradoxical position of money can be further illustrated through a
hypothetical scenario: mankind’s agreement (express or tacit) to cease using
money. Let us suppose that mankind was discontented with the inequalities
and “inconveniences” engendered by the use of money in the state of nature,
and decided, by universal consent, to cast it into desuetude. As a conse-
quence, ceteris paribus, the evaporation of the medium of accumulation
would entail a massive decline in the common stock of mankind, precipitous
fall in trade, disappearance of the main motive for enclosure and improve-
ment, shrinkage of possessions because of the spoilage limitation, and the
return to the common waste of all that has been hitherto accumulated
beyond hand-to-mouth existence. This would not only drastically reduce
the aggregate conveniences of life (the English laborer would now be fed,
lodged, and clad more or less like an Indian king), but it would also violate
the moral obligations under the natural law by allowing the value produced
by labor to perish uselessly and by wasting the already subdued and
60One could argue that inheritance of property partakes in the same conceptual
ambiguity. However, inheritance is directly traceable to the “strong desire of propagat-
ing their kind . . . and continuing themselves in posterity” that “God planted in men”
(which qualiﬁes inheritance as an innate right: II. 56, 88, 190), and can be more broadly
subsumed under the natural law obligation to preserve mankind (I. 41, 86). What
renders money peculiar in comparison is that it lacks a parallel recourse to a natural
framework of rights and obligations while having the normative-obligatory efﬁcacy
of this framework.
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improved land. In short, the withdrawal of the tacit consent from the use of
money amounts to a profound moral effrontery, and for this reason it
cannot, or rather must not, be withdrawn. Hence, whereas all conventional
relations established by mutual consent among men, including marriage,
exchange, or even government, can be undone by another act of mutual
consent, the same freedom cannot be permitted in the case of money. In
other words, if it is an act of consent that founds money, then it is the only
consent that cannot be retracted without violating the natural law. As a
result, the inconveniences introduced to the state of nature by money have
to be regulated by the government founded on a further act of consent.61
Yet the power of revolution vested in “the people” in the case of civil govern-
ment lacks a counterpart in the case of money, which is ultimately the cause of
the institution of government. Regicide is permitted; disaccumulation is not.
Governments come and go; progress rolls onward.
Conclusion
This essay has considered one speciﬁc aspect of Locke’s notion of money,
namely, its pivotal function as a realm of theoretical indeterminacy that
abridges the distance between progress-as-God’s-design and progress-as-
capital-accumulation. More speciﬁcally, money enables Locke to demonstrate
that the capitalistic relations of his time (enclosures, subjection of nature to
the logic of value extraction, enhanced productive efﬁciency of labor, and
61Formation of commonwealths, while remedying the “inconveniences” (inequality,
contention, and quarrel) ushered in by the invention of money, opens to question the
universalistic tendencies of accumulation extrapolated from Locke’s theory. In a
recently published article, Alex Tuckness interrogates the limits of Lockean altruism
and concludes that governments are empowered to act to preserve mankind only if
such actions do not impair their own citizens’ interests. Nevertheless, Tuckness dis-
tinguishes between the national objectives of speciﬁc governments and the objectives
of government as such, contending “that a government limited to pursuing the preser-
vation of its own members was furthering, not hindering, the preservation of all
mankind” (Alex Tuckness, “Punishment, Property, and the Limits of Altruism:
Locke’s International Asymmetry,” American Political Science Review 102, no. 4 [2008]:
472). From this perspective, it is possible to conceive of Locke’s notion of common-
wealth mainly as a contrivance devised to make mankind better off, ﬁrst and foremost
by securing the conditions of investment, innovation, and accumulation. The degree to
which these conditions are maintained and improved becomes the universal criterion
for judging the performance of speciﬁc governments. Therefore, although I concur
with Tuckness’s observation that the role Locke tailored for government was the pro-
motion of “economic growth,” I disagree with his conclusion that economic growth
was exclusively geared to buttress national security. As Pincus demonstrates, the
secular welfare of citizens and subjects was a self-standing concern of the Whig politi-
cal vision (Pincus, 1688, 369, 372, 396–97).
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monetarization of exchange) are one and the same as the consummation of a
divinely sanctioned moral purpose. However, there remain numerous
avenues of analysis promised by adopting the peculiar position of money
as a vantage point from which to look anew on the familiar vistas of the
Lockean landscape. I will mention two such avenues that more readily
follow from the foregoing discussion. First, the diagnosis of the paradoxical
nature of the consent given to money calls for further theorization of this
topic with more sustained and systematic reference to Locke’s broader
theory of consent and a wider array of his works—an endeavor not permitted
by the limited space here. Such theorization not only would have the merit of
questioning and clarifying the position proposed here but would also offer
Locke scholarship a new angle for approaching Locke’s theory of consent.
The second avenue of thought concerns Locke’s theory of the self. It has
been noted in prominent Locke scholarship that Locke’s “futural” conception
of the self turns on the faculty of abstraction and on the correlate capacity to
distance oneself from one’s sensory impressions, thereby apprehending
oneself as consciousness persisting over time.62 Yet very scant attention has
been paid to the operation of money as a quotidian medium that trains the
faculty of abstraction and practically enables rational planning oriented
towards perceived future goods.63 This undertheorization is surprising
given that this strand of analysis can contribute to demonstrating the connec-
tions between the epistemological and political-economic works of Locke,
despite the insistence of the Cambridge school to the contrary. A particular
yet momentous corollary of centering on this nexus is to revitalize the ques-
tion of the class dimension in Locke’s thought, for example, by exploring
the implications for moral and political subjectivity of the command over
money and hence the capacity for planned investment, in direct contrast to
being dispossessed and thus leading a hand-to-mouth existence.64
These are but two possible lines for further engagement with Locke’s phil-
osophy broached by the analysis of his notion of money in this discussion.
Many more await the inquisitive gaze of the researcher. Aporias and contra-
dictions that one encounters in Locke’s thought constitute privileged sites for
62Zuckert, Natural Rights, 279–87, and Launching Liberalism, 195–97; Waldron, God,
Locke, Equality, 75; McClure, Judging Rights, 176.
63One exception is Caffentzis (Clipped Coins, 70–1).
64There is a striking, if mainly heuristic, resemblance between Locke’s statement on
the condition of the English working poor, “For the Labourer’s share, being seldom
more than a bare subsistence, never allows that Body of Men time or opportunity to
raise their Thoughts above that, or struggle with the Richer for theirs” (Some
Considerations, 290–91) and Zuckert’s explication of Locke’s theory of the person,
“Abstracting lifts the mind out of the given ﬂow of sensation and allows it to stand
in semisovereign sway over its own contents” (Zuckert, Natural Rights, 283; cf.
Waldron, God, Locke, Equality, 75; Caffentzis, Clipped Coins, 70–71; and McClure,
Judging Rights, 176).
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gaining novel insights into his thought, and it has been the aim of this essay to
excavate one of them. The task that lies ahead is to delve deeper into this and
other sites in order to reconstruct the complex philosophical constellation that
characterizes Locke’s corpus, and highlight its relevance for thinking about
the political questions of the present.
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